Engaging Cyprus’s EU Council Presidency 2026

Introduction

In the second half of 2012, the Republic of Cyprus held the rotating Presidency of the Council of the EU – a period that coincided with a pivotal stage in Serbia’s EU integration. Cyprus, one of five EU members not recognizing Kosovo’s independence, leveraged its presidency to support Serbia’s European aspirations. Notably, Cyprus maintained its principled non-recognition stance throughout 2012 and “continue[d] to support Serbia on its European integration course,” even urging that Serbia be given more time to meet EU conditions rather than face undue pressure over Kosovo. In March 2012, just months before Cyprus assumed the presidency, Serbia achieved EU candidate status, marking significant progress after years of reforms and dialogue with Kosovo.

During the Cyprus Presidency, Belgrade implemented landmark agreements like integrated administrative line management with Priština, which EU ministers welcomed as “good progress” – though they postponed a firm date for accession talks pending further normalization efforts. Cypriot officials actively championed enlargement: Cyprus’s then Foreign Minister Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis chose Belgrade for her visit in July 2012, underscoring that the Western Balkans and Serbia were among the Cyprus EU Presidency’s priorities. This supportive climate meant that Kosovo’s status was not made a formal obstacle during that period.

Looking ahead to 2026, Cyprus’s next EU Council Presidency offers Serbia a strategically important window. Cyprus’s continued non-recognition of Kosovo carries symbolic weight, demonstrating within EU institutions that not all member states link Serbia’s accession to recognizing Kosovo’s statehood. Procedurally, a Cypriot presidency can influence agendas and language in EU forums, ensuring issues like Western Balkans enlargement remain prominent while moderating any push to tie Serbia’s progress to Kosovo recognition. Indeed, Cyprus’s President Nikos Christodoulides has declared his country in 2023 “the strongest supporter of Serbia’s European path”, a sentiment reciprocated by Belgrade’s steadfast support for Cyprus’s sovereignty. Cyprus holds intergovernmental summits only with Greece, Egypt, and Serbia - a rare format that underscores its exceptionally close bond with Belgrade and reflects the strategic importance of the bilateral relationship.

The following analysis outlines five key areas in which Serbia should act before and during Cyprus’s EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2026, capitalizing on this partnership to advance its EU accession and regional objectives.

1. Diplomatic Coordination and Kosovo Policy Alignment with Cyprus (2025 – 2026)

Objective: Leverage Cyprus’s EU Council Presidency to reinforce Serbia’s accession trajectory while ensuring that Kosovo’s recognition is not imposed as a condition for membership.

Actions:

• Deepen Bilateral Engagements: Serbia should intensify diplomatic coordination with Cyprus through frequent high-level visits and strategic dialogue in the lead-up to 2026. Notably, Cyprus held an intergovernmental summit with Serbia in November 2023 – a rare format otherwise reserved only for Greece and Egypt – demonstrating the exceptional closeness of the bilateral relationship. These engagements allow both sides to privately align policy positions and reinforce mutual support, as exemplified by President Christodoulides’s public affirmation of Cyprus as Serbia’s strongest EU supporter. Serbia should use this momentum to encourage Cyprus to maintain Western Balkans enlargement as a top priority during its presidency and to institutionalize support for Serbia’s reform-driven accession process.

  
  

• Coordinate with the “Kosovo Non-Recognizers” informal group: Serbia should work with Cyprus and the four other EU non-recognizers of Kosovo (Greece, Romania, Slovakia, Spain) to ensure a common position within the Council. This informal group can help insulate Serbia from efforts to link progress in EU negotiations to Kosovo recognition, while jointly advocating for Council conclusions that assess enlargement on technical and reform benchmarks. Cyprus has already demonstrated readiness to defend this principle, repeatedly advocating that Serbia be allowed to fulfill its obligations at its own pace, without facing politicized conditions.

  
  

• Promote a Gradual Normalization Strategy within EU Discourse: Serbia must shift the EU’s approach to the Kosovo dialogue away from a binary recognition model and toward a phased process emphasizing tangible cooperation. Cyprus, having consistently praised Serbia’s constructive engagement and criticized Priština’s lack of reciprocity, is well-positioned to support this shift. Serbia should provide Nicosia with alternative proposals, such as EU-monitored economic and legal frameworks, that improve practical relations without requiring de jure recognition. These proposals can be advanced through Cyprus-led discussions during its presidency, legitimizing a model of normalization rooted in stability and mutual implementation.

  
  

• Shape the Language of EU Conclusions: Working in tandem, Belgrade and Nicosia should influence the tone and content of EU Council conclusions during the presidency. The goal is to embed language that promotes “stability-first” outcomes, supports step-by-step implementation of existing agreements, and avoids direct reference to recognition. Cyprus can also take the lead in proposing informal expert discussions within the EU on managing unresolved status issues – potentially drawing from models like the “two Germanys” approach. Such framing would not only extend Serbia’s diplomatic room to maneuver but also enshrine a precedent for managing complex bilateral disputes within the EU without imposing maximalist conditions.

2. Push for Accelerated EU Structural Integration Before Full Membership

Objective: Deepen Serbia’s participation in EU sectoral initiatives and economic frameworks ahead of full membership, so that by 2026, Serbia is functionally more integrated with the Union.

Actions:

• Capitalize on the EU’s New “Growth Plan”: Serbia should fully embrace and implement the European Commission’s 2023 Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, and encourage Cyprus to showcase Serbia as a success under this plan during its presidency. The Growth Plan aims to integrate the Western Balkan partners into the EU’s single market and bring forward some membership benefits ahead of accession. It includes a €6 billion Reform and Growth Facility to accelerate socio-economic convergence. In practical terms, Serbia can fast-track alignment with EU standards in areas like free movement of goods, services, transport, and energy, as these are sectors the EU plans to open early to the region. By early 2026, Belgrade should identify specific single-market rules it can adopt unilaterally and sectors for pilot integration (for instance, joining the EU’s roaming-free zone or power grid coordination). Serbia can then work with Cyprus to obtain political recognition for these efforts, for example, a Cyprus Presidency event or communiqué applauding Serbia for extending the EU's four freedoms into the Western Balkans. This not only tangibly links Serbia to EU structures but also provides Cyprus with a positive enlargement narrative to champion.

  
  

• Pursue Mini-Deals on Trade and Investment: Leading up to 2026, Serbia should negotiate agreements that effectively deepen its EU integration short of membership. With Cyprus’s support, Belgrade can seek accelerated inclusion in EU programs and initiatives: joining EU digital and green transition projects and participating in joint infrastructure investments. For instance, Serbia might push for an upgrade to its Stabilisation and Association Agreement to further liberalize trade in agriculture or services – a step Cyprus could facilitate by rallying support in the Council. Likewise, Serbia can propose a special arrangement to partake in EU transport networks or research programs such as Horizon Europe as an observer or associate. By 2026, these sectoral integrations would allow Serbia to function almost as a de facto member in key domains. Cyprus’s presidency can host high-level meetings to formalize such arrangements, reinforcing the message that enlargement can be a gradual, positive-sum process.

  
  

• Link Mediterranean and Balkan Connectivity: In collaboration with Cyprus, identify regional projects that connect the Eastern Mediterranean with the Balkans, positioning Serbia as a hub. This could involve expanding the scope of EU-backed infrastructure corridors – for example, transportation routes or digital fiber-optic links running from Greece (and by extension, Cyprus via sea links) into Serbia and further north. Serbia should lobby for inclusion in any Mediterranean initiatives that Cyprus highlights during its presidency, such as EU discussions on maritime transport or energy interconnections. One idea is a Serbia-Cyprus-Greece working group (formed in 2024 – 25) on connectivity, which could develop proposals like extending the Trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) into the Western Balkans or creating a Balkan node for the planned EuroAsia Interconnector (an electricity link from Israel/Cyprus to Europe). By advocating these ideas, Serbia aligns itself with Cyprus’s regional vision and demonstrates how Serbian integration can also benefit the broader EU (by improving North-South linkages in Europe). Accelerating participation in such networks before membership will smooth Serbia’s eventual accession and deliver immediate economic benefits.

3. Strengthen Bilateral Economic and Energy Relations with Cyprus

Objective: Reduce Serbia’s energy dependence on Russia and build mutual trust through stronger economic ties with Cyprus, underscoring Serbia’s reliability as a future EU member and partner.

Actions:

• Diversify Energy Supplies via East Med Routes: Serbia has already taken strides to access alternative gas supplies – the new Serbia-Bulgaria pipeline link, completed in late 2023, connects Serbia to the LNG terminal in Alexandroupolis, Greece. This enables Serbia to import liquefied natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond, significantly cutting reliance on Russian gas. Now, Serbia should seek Cyprus’s partnership in energy security. One step is to support and potentially tap into the proposed EastMed pipeline project, which aims to bring Eastern Mediterranean gas (from Israel and Cyprus’s offshore fields) to Europe via Cyprus and Greece. Belgrade can engage Cypriot energy authorities to explore long-term contracts or swaps for Cypriot gas once it comes on stream, or co-investment opportunities in LNG infrastructure. By 2026, Serbia could position itself as an EU-linked energy hub in Southeast Europe, receiving gas through Greece (including Cypriot-sourced gas) and distributing it to neighbors. This not only bolsters Serbia’s energy independence but also aligns with EU diversification goals, earning goodwill in Brussels.

  
  

• Promote Two-Way Investment and Trade: Despite modest trade volumes - $44.1 million in Serbian exports to Cyprus in 2023 and $6.3 million in Cypriot exports to Serbia in 2021 –0economic relations are steadily growing, with Cyprus emerging as a notable investor, having contributed approximately €526.9 million in FDI to Serbia between 2010 and 2021, ranking among the country’s top 15 sources of foreign investment. Strengthening economic ties will solidify the political partnership. Building on the agreements from the 2023 summit, where Serbia and Cyprus decided to increase bilateral tourism, trade, and signed memoranda on education and technology cooperation, Serbia should actively facilitate Cypriot businesses investing in its economy and vice versa. Practical measures include organizing business forums for Cypriot companies (especially in tourism, banking, real estate, and energy services) to invest in Serbia, offering incentives, and highlighting Serbia’s growth potential as an EU candidate. Likewise, encourage Serbian firms to explore opportunities in Cyprus or joint ventures in areas like construction and shipping. An immediate initiative could be a tourism promotion campaign coordinated by both governments, which is something they have already agreed upon to increase travel and familiarity between the two peoples. More flights and tourist exchanges lay the groundwork for closer business ties. Expanding the currently modest trade will build trust and constituencies in both countries that support the political alliance. By 2026, a noticeable uptick in commerce – whether it’s Cypriot investment in Serbian solar parks or Serbian food exports to Cyprus – will demonstrate the tangible benefits of the partnership.

  
  

• Enhance Cooperation on Regional Energy Projects: Serbia and Cyprus can launch a bilateral energy initiative as a flagship cooperation project. For instance, Serbia might invite Cyprus to contribute expertise or capital to renewable energy projects in Serbia (solar or wind farms), symbolically reducing carbon footprints and dependence on Russian fossil fuels. Conversely, Serbia can offer technical know-how in areas it’s strong in, such as electricity distribution or hydropower, to support Cyprus’s energy plans. Both countries should also coordinate within the wider region: working with Greece, they can develop a Mediterranean-Balkans energy corridor. One concrete idea is a trilateral Serbia-Cyprus-Greece task force on LNG and electricity interconnection. This body could plan how Serbian pipelines and power grids might carry Eastern Mediterranean gas and green electricity into the Balkans. By accessing the East Med gas through Greece, Serbia not only diversifies its own supply but could re-export or transit gas further, boosting its standing as a regional transit hub. Such moves will be viewed favorably in the EU – Serbia aligning with non-Russian energy sources and Cyprus helping a candidate state improve energy resilience. Ultimately, stronger energy ties buttress Serbia’s argument that it will enrich the EU’s energy security upon membership.

5. Long-Term Impact of the Cyprus-Serbia Partnership in 2026

By strategically leveraging Cyprus’s EU Council Presidency, Serbia stands to gain numerous long-term advantages for its EU accession journey:

• Focus on Normalization Instead of Recognition: With Nicosia’s diplomatic cover, Serbia can approach the Kosovo issue through gradual compromise rather than ultimatums. A successful 2026 presidency that emphasizes stability and dialogue could set a precedent for EU policy to decouple formal recognition from the core accession criteria. Cyprus and its like-minded partners can ensure that as long as Serbia continues implementing agreements and constructively engaging in talks, its EU negotiations will not be derailed. This implicit easing of Kosovo-related conditions means Serbia could open or even close negotiating clusters without a final status deal – a crucial breathing space for a lasting settlement. The Cypriot Minister in 2012 voiced this philosophy, saying Cyprus would continue to support Serbia as it fulfills EU conditions at its own pace. In 2026, such support at the Council level can translate into concrete milestones for Serbia (e.g., moving ahead in accession talks) even if a comprehensive Kosovo resolution remains a work in progress.

  
  

• Deeper Energy and Economic Resilience: A stronger Serbia-Cyprus bond will accelerate Serbia’s economic integration with European markets and energy systems. By accessing Eastern Mediterranean gas and attracting Cypriot (and Greek) investments, Serbia can significantly reduce its dependence on Russian energy and capital. This diversification enhances Serbia’s resilience and makes it a more secure prospective EU member. In the long term, Serbia’s positioning as an energy transit hub linking Mediterranean resources to Central Europe could be a game-changer for its economy. Likewise, increased trade, tourism, and joint projects with Cyprus will boost growth and innovation. These ties also give Cyprus a vested interest in Serbia’s stability and success, ensuring sustained advocacy for Serbia within EU institutions. The trust built through business and energy partnerships will make the political relationship truly “brotherly,” as President Vučić described – “Cypriots are more than friends to us, they are our brothers”, with cooperation “in all sectors” including crucial help “in Brussels. Such closeness means Serbia will have a steadfast ally lobbying for its interests at every step of the EU accession process.

  
  

• Stronger Southern European Support Bloc: Successfully engaging Cyprus could catalyze a broader Southern European coalition favoring enlargement. Greece, Romania, Slovakia, and Spain are natural allies on the Kosovo issue; if Cyprus’s presidency highlights Serbia’s positive momentum, these states are likely to amplify that message. Moreover, other Mediterranean EU members (Italy, Malta, and even France to some extent) might view favorably an initiative led by Cyprus that stabilizes the Western Balkans – Europe’s southeast flank. The outcome could be a coalition of support spanning from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Iberian Peninsula, championing Serbia’s EU membership as a strategic investment in European unity and security. This would balance out more skeptical voices within the EU and embed Serbia’s aspirations into a wider geopolitical context. By 2026, Serbia could thus find itself backed not only by its traditional friends but by a network of states seeing mutual benefit in its accession. That kind of broad support is vital for the final, unanimous approval needed for EU membership.

  
  

• All the above efforts contribute to one ultimate result – Serbia moving faster and more smoothly into EU structures. By the end of Cyprus’s presidency in mid-2026, Serbia should aim to have opened any remaining negotiation clusters and be well on the way to meeting closing benchmarks in key chapters. The intensive sectoral integration (in economy, energy, digital policy, etc.) means that by the time of full membership, the adjustment period for Serbia will be shorter and simpler, both for Serbia and the EU. Early integration of markets and norms, supported by Cyprus and others, essentially front-loads the benefits of membership for Serbian citizens. They will start experiencing tangible improvements – from economic investment to energy security to easier travel – even before accession day. This helps maintain public support for the EU path. For the EU, having Serbia deeply enmeshed in its initiatives by 2026 reduces uncertainty about Serbia’s readiness. In strategic terms, the Western Balkans’ EU future becomes more irreversible.

In conclusion, the Cyprus-Serbia partnership, if diligently nurtured in the run-up to and during the 2026 EU Council Presidency, can significantly propel Serbia’s EU integration. It offers a rare alignment of interests: Cyprus gains prestige by advancing enlargement and vindicating its principled stance on Kosovo, while Serbia gains a powerful advocate steering the EU’s agenda in its favor. Both countries, through their cooperation, reinforce the idea that European unity is achievable without every bilateral dispute being a roadblock. By targeting Cyprus with a well-structured diplomatic game plan – high-level coordination, a shared approach to Kosovo, accelerated integration steps, and bolstered bilateral ties – Serbia can make 2026 a turning point on its EU path. The long-term payoffs would be profound: a Serbia closer than ever to full EU membership, with fewer political hurdles, a stronger economy, and a network of friends in the Union ensuring that the finish line is firmly in sight.

Date:
April 30th 2025

Authors:
Vuk Velebit, Pupin Initiative
Aleksa Jovanović, Pupin Initiative