Multilateral Cooperation in the Balkans: Where Things Fell Apart & Future Obstacles

The End of Armed Conflicts & Baby Steps to Multilateralism

During the 1990s, after the fall of communism, the Balkan region witnessed a great deal of violence, wars, and destruction. With around 140,000 casualties and 4 million people displaced, the region feels the negative consequences to this day. Despite regional political elites still exploiting antagonistic narratives about their neighbouring countries for their own political needs, there have been various initiatives for multilateral cooperation from the start of the twenty-first century.

Even though paranoia still exists, and the cooperation is still not at a satisfactory level, needed to overcome traumas and disputes from the past, concrete steps have been made, and change can not come overnight. It is important that the regional actors somewhat understand that the cycle of violence needs to be broken, and that peaceful coexistence and cooperation are the only constructive way for the future.

After the wars of the 1990s, Serbia gradually began re-engaging with its neighbours through regional initiatives aimed at rebuilding trust and fostering cooperation. While it was not always the initiator, Serbia actively participated in key frameworks like the Stability Pact, SEECP, and later the Berlin Process. Over time, it also took a more proactive role, most notably by co-launching the Open Balkan initiative to deepen regional economic integration.

Key Balkan Initiatives - Various Attempts at Cooperation

There have been over 13 big multilateral initiatives that helped foster cooperation in the Balkans, but the most influential are:

Central European Initiative (CEI)

The Central European Initiative is the oldest regional forum involving the Balkans, established in 1989 as a platform for East–West cooperation. It gradually expanded to 17 member states in Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe, including several Balkan countries (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Montenegro, North Macedonia, Serbia, Slovenia) alongside neighbours like Italy, Austria, Poland, and Ukraine. The CEI’s core mission has been to promote regional cooperation for European integration and sustainable development, helping its members transition politically and economically toward EU membership.

The CEI has played a significant role in supporting various projects across the Balkans, focusing on areas such as governance, energy, environmental protection, and regional cooperation. Notable initiatives include:

• Know-how Exchange Programme (KEP) Projects: In recent years, the CEI approved several KEP projects aimed at enhancing capacities in the Western Balkans. These projects, amounting to approximately €200,000, cover diverse areas including academia, human rights, cultural heritage, arts cooperation, food regulatory frameworks, and youth cooperation.

• Strengthening Parliamentary Capacities: The CEI has supported initiatives to bolster the capacities of parliaments in Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, and Ukraine, aligning them with EU accession processes.

• Energy Sector Development: Projects focusing on the fundamentals of EU natural gas markets, regulatory frameworks, and challenges for market integration and decarbonization have been implemented, involving energy authorities from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, and Montenegro.

• Environmental Protection and Sustainable Tourism: Initiatives such as enhancing sustainable tourism development in Montenegro and capacity building for marine pollution preparedness in Albania have been undertaken to promote environmental sustainability.

• Urban Governance and Civil Society Engagement: Projects like "Urban Nexus: Empowering Local Governance in the Western Balkans" and support for civil society in good governance and anti-corruption efforts have been part of CEI's commitment to strengthening institutional frameworks and civic participation.

Regional Cooperation Council (RCC)

The Regional Cooperation Council comes as an expansion and an upgrade from the Stability Pact (formed in 1999). The RCC was officially launched on 27 February 2008 and took over the Stability Pact’s resources and responsibilities, but with a crucial difference: the RCC is led by the region itself (its Secretary-General is a representative from the Balkans).

The RCC’s mission is to promote and streamline regional cooperation across key areas: economic and social development, energy and infrastructure, justice and home affairs, security cooperation, and building human capital. It acts as a focal point, monitoring regional initiatives, avoiding duplication, and advocating the region’s interests to donors (notably aligning with EU pre-accession funds).

The most successful projects and initiatives coordinated by the RCC, but are parts of the later discussed initiatives, include:

• Common Regional Market (CRM): This project includes mobility agreements (mutual recognition of professional/academic qualifications, ID travel), supports regional digital integration (e-commerce, 5G, cyber policies), and enables trade facilitation via “Green Lanes,” reducing border wait times up to 70%.

• Regional Roaming Agreement: Agreed upon in 2021 by the Western Balkan Six (WB6), it facilitated negotiations and a technical roadmap and eliminated roaming charges across the Western Balkans.

• Western Balkans Youth Lab (WBYL): With the EU funding, the project promotes structured youth-policy dialogue in WB6 and develops youth policy labs, mapped national strategies, and enhanced youth councils’ capacities.

Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA)

CEFTA is an initiative that facilitates free trade as a prep school for EU membership. Originally founded by the Eastern European countries that later joined the EU, it expanded to the Western Balkan countries and Moldova, which aim for EU membership.

The framework's objective is to eliminate tariffs and trade barriers within the region, thereby boosting intra-regional commerce and investment, and helping these economies harmonize with EU trade standards (competition rules, sanitary standards).

Key projects implemented, with the help of RCC, include the aforementioned Common Regional Market, reducing administrative border procedures, which were slowing the trade flow, and the development of digital trade by promoting electronic exchange of trade documents and enhancing digital infrastructure.

The next phase of the CRM Action Plan (2025–2028) aims to build on the foundations laid during 2021–2024 by moving from regulatory alignment to practical integration with the EU Single Market. While the current CRM focused on removing internal barriers and simplifying regional trade, the new phase will prioritize full implementation of liberalized services (via CEFTA’s Additional Protocol 6), operationalizing dispute resolution mechanisms (AP7), and introducing pilot projects for direct WB–EU economic connectivity. While the goal is optimistic and the change made was substantial, there are still major obstacles in achieving these goals, particularly in the lack of will by the regional political leaders.

Berlin Process

The Berlin Process is an intergovernmental initiative launched in 2014 by Germany to re-energize reform and reconciliation in the Western Balkans during a period when EU enlargement had stalled. Initiated by Chancellor Angela Merkel, the process convenes annual summits between the WB6 countries and interested EU states (such as Germany, France, Italy, and Austria), plus the European Commission. The objective is to strengthen and deepen regional integration in and with the Western Balkans, thereby complementing the EU accession process. Key focus areas have been infrastructure connectivity (transport and energy projects linking the Balkans internally and with the EU), youth cooperation, facilitation of mobility ( recognition of diplomas, reducing roaming charges), economic development, and good-neighbourly relations (including addressing bilateral disputes and transitional justice).

Over the years, the Berlin Process has achieved several notable outcomes:

• Connectivity Agenda: It mobilized substantial EU funding for the project, resulting in the construction and modernization of highways, railway lines, and energy interconnectors across the region, thereby enhancing physical and energy infrastructure.

• Regional Youth Cooperation Office (RYCO): Established in 2016, and by 2024 it enabled over 31,000 youth exchanges aimed at fostering reconciliation, intercultural dialogue, and regional identity among young people.

• Regional Roaming Agreement: It eliminated roaming fees between the six Western Balkan countries, an important step toward creating a shared digital market.

• Common Regional Market: Before-mentioned initiative, building on CEFTA but going further by aiming to align the region’s economies with the EU single market in areas such as digital trade, investment, services, and labour mobility.

• Civil Society Forum: Aimed to give voice to NGOs, youth networks, and research institutions, and allow civil society actors to actively contribute to regional policymaking and EU-oriented reforms.

Open Balkan

The Open Balkan initiative, originally called “Mini-Schengen”, was launched in October 2019 by the leaders of Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia in Novi Sad to create a regional economic area that allows the free movement of people, goods, services, and capital. In July 2021, the initiative was officially rebranded as “Open Balkan,” extending an open invitation to Kosovo, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina to join, but their joining is still on hold, with their fear of potential Belgrade dominance. The central idea is to deliver practical economic and mobility benefits to citizens of the region even before EU accession is achieved. Notable achievements include:

• Free Movement of People (ID Travel and Work Permits): One of the most tangible achievements of Open Balkan is the removal of visa and work permit requirements among the three member countries. Citizens of Albania, North Macedonia, and Serbia can now live and work freely in each other’s countries using only an ID card, with no need for a residence or work permit. This has particularly benefited cross-border employment in hospitality, agriculture, and construction sectors, easing labour shortages.

• Mutual Recognition of Diplomas and Professional Qualifications: The members signed agreements to mutually recognize higher education diplomas and professional credentials. This enables skilled workers to have their qualifications recognized without lengthy revalidation procedures, boosting labour mobility and professional exchange in the region.

• Harmonization of Customs Procedures and Trade Facilitation: The Open Balkan countries committed to coordinating customs procedures, especially for food and agricultural products. This includes mutual acceptance of sanitary and phytosanitary controls, which significantly reduces administrative delays at borders. Joint customs working groups were formed to identify bottlenecks and align border inspection practices.

• Joint Crisis Response Mechanisms (Food Security & Natural Disasters): In response to rising concerns over global supply chain disruptions, the initiative includes a framework for mutual assistance in times of crisis, such as emergency food supply coordination and disaster response mechanisms. Countries pledged to avoid export bans within the bloc and to support one another in cases of supply shortages or natural disasters.

• Economic Forums and Investment Promotion: The three countries have held multiple joint economic forums aimed at attracting foreign investment and showcasing the benefits of a unified regional market. These forums bring together private sector leaders and government officials to explore business opportunities across borders.

According to a World Bank estimate, full implementation of Open Balkan policies could result in €3.2 billion in annual savings for businesses and travellers, including 30 million hours saved at border crossings. This highlights the initiative’s potential to improve regional competitiveness and reduce the cost of doing business.

Overview & Comparison

Here is a short comparison of all the discussed initiatives in the text:

Why is progress limited? Identifying Key Hindrances

Analyzing the most important multilateral Balkan Initiatives, there are a few crucial obstacles in achieving their goal to the fullest:

• Large number of initiatives & overlapping spheres of cooperation - While in this text only five key initiatives were discussed, there are over 13 big multilateral initiatives that are connected to the WB countries. This opens room for confusion, duplication of jurisdiction and tasks, and lowers the credibility of each initiative. A lower number (maximum 3) of cooperation frameworks would boost efficiency and gain more authority and recognition.

• Different foreign backers and helpers - With the great majority of the initiatives being backed by the EU, different member states have contributed to different initiatives. Also, the US is backing the Open Balkan, while the Germans dominate the Berlin process, so that situation also brings inefficiency, slows down the already inert decision-making and implementation process, and could create strategic gaps, given the different interests of the foreign backers.

• Paranoia of half of the WB actors - In contrast to Serbia, Albania, and North Macedonia, who have shown a great deal of political will to cooperate with other regional actors, BiH, Kosovo, and Montenegro have concerns about the result of further integration and cooperation. The fear is dominated by the narrative of being swallowed by the bigger actors, mostly Belgrade, which has the largest and most resilient economy. Also, there is a political dimension, given the lack of cooperation by the Kosovo administration and BiH, fueled only by the ideological hostility toward Belgrade.

• Lack of institutionalized decision-making structures - One of the key challenges facing regional initiatives in the Western Balkans is their weak institutionalization, which significantly hampers the effectiveness and sustainability of cooperation. While some frameworks like CEFTA, CEI, and the RCC have established secretariats and formal decision-making structures, others, most notably the Berlin Process and Open Balkan, rely primarily on occasional summits and the political will of leaders, without permanent bodies, legally binding mechanisms, or oversight institutions.

• Non-tariff barriers - Despite progress in liberalizing trade through CEFTA and regional market initiatives, non-tariff barriers (NTBs) remain a persistent obstacle to economic integration in the Western Balkans. These include inconsistent sanitary and phytosanitary regulations, burdensome customs procedures, and a lack of mutual recognition of product standards. NTBs not only delay cross-border trade but also discourage investment and undermine trust between countries.

• Dependence on the EU political momentum - Another critical weakness of regional cooperation lies in its dependence on EU-led or externally driven initiatives, rather than being genuinely owned and sustained by local actors. While frameworks like the Berlin Process and Connectivity Agenda have brought valuable funding and political momentum, they often reflect Brussels-based priorities more than regional consensus. This reliance has created a pattern where progress stalls when EU attention shifts elsewhere, revealing a fragile foundation for long-term cooperation.

Which Initiatives Benefit Serbia the Most and the Reasons Behind It

Recommendations for Maximizing the Results of Regional Cooperation

• Overlapping and Fragmented Initiatives: Serbia should initiate a regional dialogue under RC to consolidate the Common Regional Market, Open Balkan, and CEFTA into a unified “Western Balkans Economic Area.” This streamlined structure would increase operational efficiency, reduce donor fatigue, and allow Serbia to act as the coordinating power in a simpler, more effective regional architecture.

• Competing Foreign Backers (EU vs US)  Serbia can establish a “Balkan Strategic Coordination Platform” based in Belgrade, inviting structured participation from the European Commission, the US, and the RCC. This would bridge policy agendas between Brussels and Washington, while positioning Serbia as the key transatlantic consensus-builder in the region.

• Gaining back trust in Belgrade from fearful WB actors: Serbia should offer confidence-building measures such as:

  • Propose rotating leadership roles in regional initiatives and voluntarily step back from leading the first term.

  • Invite neutral observers (RCC, OSCE) to monitor implementation and increase transparency.

  • Initiate symbolic gestures such as reconciliation events, intercultural dialogues, and civil society platforms.

• Weak Institutionalization of Regional Structures: Serbia should propose the establishment of a permanent Open Balkan Secretariat in Belgrade (or any other WB capital), with rotating deputy directors from other member countries and an independent advisory council.

• Persistent Non-Tariff Barriers (NTBs): Serbia can lead a pilot project with Albania and North Macedonia to mutually recognize sanitary and phytosanitary standards and fully digitize customs clearance. This could produce a spillover effect with other WB actors.

• Dependence on EU Political Momentum: Government and public diplomacy campaign in which the benefits of the WB integration as a path to the EU integration will be presented, and the need for a cooperative consensus between the states.

• Join the Three Seas Initiative as an Observer, and continue pursuing full membership: Serbia should actively pursue observer status in the 3SI, leveraging its ties with Hungary, Austria, and Croatia. Aligning with 3SI infrastructure and digital priorities would give Serbia access to EU-co-financed transport corridors, alternative energy routes (e.g., LNG terminals), and pan-regional digital infrastructure. This enhances Serbia’s strategic visibility and helps link the Western Balkans with Central Europe.

Date:
June 18, 2025

Authors:
Vuk Velebit, Pupin Initiative
Petar Ivić, Pupin Initiative